International energy cooperation from a European Community perspective. Speech by M. Carpentier, Director General of the Commission of the European Communities. Knoxville, Tennessee, 27 May 1982 by Carpentier, Michel.
~~-~---~-~------------------------------
INTERNATIONAL  ENERGY  COOPERATION  FROM  A EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY  PERSPECTIVE 
by  M.  CARPENTIER,  Director  General 
of  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communiti~s 
INTRODUCTION 
Chairman,  Ladies  ~nd Gentlemen, 
I  was  delighted to  be  able  to  accept  the  invitation by  the 
organisers of  this  symposium  to  introduce  today's  session 
on  the  theme  of  international  eriergy  cooperation. 
The  growing  interdependence of the  world  economy  has  now  become 
something  of  a  cliche.  But  this does  not  make  it any  less of  a  reality. 
And  it  is  as  much  a  reality  in  the  energy sector  as  it  is  in  respect of the 
other  key  elements  in  the  development  of  the  world  economy  - trade,  monetary 
affairs  and  the  general  conduct  of  our  macro-economic  policies.  Indeed,  energy  is 
bound  up  closely  with  each  of  them.  So  it  is  a  critically important  issue on 
which  to  base  your  discussions. 
I  am  representing  here  the  European  Commission  and,  through  it, 
the  European  Communities.  My  perspective on  the  question of  international 
energy  cooperation  is  inevitably that  of  a  European.  i  intend  therefore 
to  dwell  on  the  issues  as  they  are  seen  from  Europe.  But  let  me  first 
try to  set  them  in  a  general  context. 
I  - THE  WORLD  ENERGY  SCENE 
A good  deal  has  happened  on  the  world  energy  scene  since  your 
first- symp osi urn-in-october-1980 -set-out -to-define-the  nature-of -the  problem. 
That  meeting  took  place  a  few  weeks  after the outbreak of 
hostilities between  Iran  and  Iraq.  There  was  a  background  of  widespread 2
oil prices- all  that on  top  of  the  more  than doubling  in prices  that  had 
~ 
occurred  during  the previous  18  months  since  the  Iranian  revolution. 
Now  the  world  scene  Looks  rather different.  Hostilities  between 
Iran  and  Iraq  continue.  But  there  is  no  shortage of oil.  Oil prices  expressed  in 
dollars  have  been  falling  and  are  continuing  to do  so  despite  further  cutbacks  in 
production  by  some  of the oil-producing  countries.  The  markets  are  softer 
than  they  have  been  since  the  mid-1970s.  There  has  been  a  dramatic  change 
in the  world's  demand  for  'liquid gold',  with  OECD  demand  falling  from 
41.1  mbd  in  1979  to-35.4  mbd  last  year,  a  drop of  14%  over  two  years. 
The  background  against  which  our  discussions  are  taking place  is 
therefore  rather different  from  October  1980.  Concern  about  the  risk of 
further  price pressures  has  given  way  in  the  industrialised countries  to 
bewilderment  about  the  reasons  for  this  remarkable  turnaround on  the oil 
markets  and  uncertainty  about  its  implications  for  the  future. 
A review of  what  has  happened  over  the  last  10  years  on  the  energy 
markets  suggests  that  any  tendency  for  over-optimism  wo~ld be  misplaced. 
We  must  welcome  and  take  advantage  of  the  softening  in the oil  markets 
and  the  beneficial  effects  on  our  balances of payments  that  follow  the 
fall  in  OECD  oil  imports.  They  will  help  to  reduce  inflationary pressures 
and  to  improve  the  prospects  for  growth. 
But  we  should  be  wary  of  concluding  that  the  risk of  longer-term 
energy  constraints  on  growth  have  been  removed  just  because of the  changes 
of the  past  two  years. 
There  are  four  main  reasons  for  caution. 3
In  the  first place,  it would  be  a  foolhardy  man  who  would  place a  bet 
on  any  particular  level  of  total  world  oil  supply  over  the  decade  or  two  ahead. 
There  are  immense  uncertainties  about  recoverable  reserves  ;  about  production 
and  depletion policies of  the major  producers;  about  the  economics  of 
'difficult'  fields  under  different oil price  scenarios;  about  the  scope  for 
economic  productfon of  non- conventional  oils.  But  even  on  relatively optimistic 
assumptions,  total  world oil  supply  in 1990  and  2000  is unlikely to  be  much 
*  above  its 1980  level  of  49.5  mbd  • 
Secondly,  it  is  even  more  difficult  to  forecast  likely  levels of 
total  world oil  demand.  Even  if we  in the  industrialised countries 
succeed  in economising  on  the  use  of oil, the  trend  may  be  significantly 
different  in  OPEC  countries  themselves,  and  in many  of  the  non-OPEC 
developing  countries.  Much  depends  on  the  prospects  for  economic  growth 
in the  developing  countries  and  their  success  in  mobilising  resources 
<both  financial,  technicaland  human)  to  increase  domestic  energy production 
and  the  efficiency of  energy  use.  Major  oil  importers  such  as  Brazil  are 
already  making  significant  efforts  in  this  respect. 
Thirdly,  none  of  us  involved  in  analysing  trerids. in  the  energy 
economy  and  advising  on  their  implications  can  satisfactorily explain 
why  both  energy  and  oil  demand  have  fallen  so  much  more  significantly  in  the 
recent  past  than  anyone  dared predict.  It  is difficult  to  tell  how  much  of  the  fa 
is based on  durable  economics  and  durable  changes  in  economic  and  industrial 
structure on  the  one  hand;  and  how  much,  on  the other  hand,  is  due  quite  simply 
to  the  recession. 
/Quite  clearly, 
*  excluding  oil produced  and  consumed  in  Centrally-Planned  Economies  (CPE) 
but  including  CPE  net  exports. 4
Quite  clearly there  has  been  something  of  a  break,  over  the past 
ten years,  in  the  link  between  economic  growth  and  the growth  in  energy 
demand.  In the --European  Community  energy  consumption  in  1980  was  virtually 
the  same  as  in  1973,  but  GDP  (gross  domestic  product)  grew  by  around  17% 
over  the  same  period.  In  1980  the fall  in energy  and  oil  demand  occurred 
while  GDP  grew  by  1.4%. 
We  have  also  witnessed  a  steady fall  in the  share of oil  in total 
energy  consumption  (from  62%·  in  the  Community  in 1973  to  around  SOY.  last 
year).  There  have  been  similar  experiences  elsewhere. 
But  no-one  can  be  sure  what  will  happen  when  growth  picks  up 
again. 
Finally  - and  this  is  an  issue  for  particular  reflection 
the present  market  situation  could  well  slow  down  the process  of 
structural change.  The  fall  in oil prices, if it  continues,  could  have 
important  implications  for  the  competitiveness  of coal.  It  may  also 
make  much  less attractive the  economics  of  some  new  energy  technologies 
and  investment  in  energy  saving. 
All  these  uncertainties  make  the results of  this  symposium  more 
and  not  less  important. 
II - THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY'S  POSITION 
The  need  for  a  'long  view'  and  the opaqueness  of  the glass  through 
which  we  seek  to  see  into  the distance  are  felt especially keenly  in  the 
European  Community. 5
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largest  single oil  importer  in  the  world,  taking  over  7  mbd  in  1981 
. 
compared  with  less  than  6  mbd  in  the  USA  and  around  5  mbd  in  Japan.  787.  of 
our  crude  oil  imports  came  from  OPEC  countries  in  1981  and  some  607.  from 
the  Near  and  Middle  East. 
Despite  the  fall  in oil  prices  expressed  in  dollars,  the  Community's 
oil  import  bill  was  around  $  100  billion last  year,  equivalent  to  some 
4  7.  of our  combined  GNP.  The  equivalent  figures  for  the  US  were  about 
Z 60  billion or  less  than  2%  of  GDP. 
The  prospects  for  oil  supplies  and  oil  prices  and  for  the 
transition away  from  oil  are  therefore of critical  importance  to  us. 
The  nature of our  transition  is also  conditioned  by  the  fact 
that  the  Community  does  not  possess  indigenous  energy  resources  (either 
oil  or  non-oil)  which  are  either on  the  same  scale or  as  easy  and  as 
cheap  to  exploit  as  those  ~f some  of our  industrial partners,  and  notably 
the  United  States. 
Much  Community  coal  is  deep-mined  and  less  competitive  than 
imports.  The  oil  resources  in  the  North  Sea  are  large,  but  even  on 
optimistic  assumptions,  oil  from  the  British  sector  is  unlikely  to  supply 
at  its peak  during  this decade  any  more  than  25%  of total  Community  oil 
consumption.  The  Community's  production of  natural  gas  has  probably 
already  passed  its  peak~ 
So  even  if  we  are  able  to  expand  efficient  domestic  coal  production, 
even  if there  is  a  significant  contribution  from  nuclear  power  (and  that  is 
constrained ultimately  by  outlets  for  electricity use),  and  even  if there  is 
a  substantial  improvement  in  energy  efficiency,  the  Community's  transition 
away  from  imported oil  is  bound  to  involve  an  increase  in  imports  of other  fuels. 6
It  is only  natural  therefore  that our  glass  should  be  trained not 
only on  the  future,  but  also  at  the  same  time on  the  rest of the  world. 
III - COMMUNITY  ENERGY  5TRATEGY 
The  Energy  Ministers  of  the  European  Community  meet  two  or  three 
times  every  year  in  Brussels to  review  the  energy  situation  in  the 
Community  and  world-wide  and  to  consider  specific proposals  for  common  action 
put  forward  by  the  European  Commission  to  sustain the  momentum  of  transition 
and  to  avoid  new  shocks  to  the  system. 
They  met  last on  16  March  this  year  and  underlined  a  common  concern 
that  the present  oil  market  situation  should  not  slow  up  the  transition away· 
from  oil  and  the  progress  towards  the  realisation of  common  energy objectives. 
These  objectives  and  the  energy  strategy  which  embraces  them  have 
evolved  in  response  first  to  the  'oil  shock'  of  1973-4  and  then  to  the 
~imulus of  the  further  dramatic  upsurge  in oil  prices  in  1979-80.  They 
focus  on  the  need  for  increased energy  efficiency and  for  the  diversification 
of  energy  supplies;  the  stimulation of  adequate  levels of  investment  in  the 
energy  sector;  a  more  coordinated  approach  to  energy  rese~rch and development 
and  innovation;  measures  to  improve  the  stability of  the energy  Cand 
particularly oil)  markets;  and  the  development  of  a  common.line  in  external 
e~ergy relations. 
It  would  be  misleading  to  suggest  that the  interests of  all  the  members 
of  the  Community  in  every  aspect of our  strategy  are  always  identical.  Or  that 
common  action  and  cooperation necessarily means  organisation,  direction  and 
intervention  from  Brussels.  The  energy  balances of  the  Member  States of  the 
Community  vary  widely  and  they  will  continue  to  do  so.  In energy,  as  in 
other  spheres,  we  are  a  diversified group  of  countries,  both  in  our  resource 
endowments,  and  in  the  emphasis  which  we  give  to  different  fuels.  At  one 7
where  indigenous  hydrocarbons  are  unlikely to provide .more  than  a  limited 
share of total  energy  requirements. 
But  the pressure of external  events  in  the past  and  a  recognition 
of the  risks  to  all  our  economies  in the  future  if the  energy  transition 
is mishandled,  have  encouraged  an  increasing  degree of communality  of purpose. 
Firstly,  Member  States  have  seen  the  dangers  to  each  and  every one 
of  them  of  renewed  instability on  the oil  markets.  All  of  us  suffer  -
including  the  UK  - if oil  supply disruptions  are  allowed  to  put  unreasonable 
pressure on  oil  prices.  All  of  us  will  suffer  if energy  is  allowed once  again 
to  stymie  the  prospects  for  economic  growth. 
Secondly,  Member  States  have  seen  the  very  positive advantages of 
cooperation  in  international  energy  matters.  The  Community's  ability to 
agree  in  1979  to  set  ceilings on  net oil  imports  up  to  1985  made  it easier 
to  secure  a  wider  international  agreement  on  similar  lines  at  the  Western 
Economic  Summit  in  Tokyo  that  year.  Similarly,  the  agreement  on  the 
programme  for  the  energy  transition agreed at  the  Western  Economic  Summit 
in Venice  in1980  was  facilitated  by  a  prior  Community  agreement  on  long-
term  energy objectives. 
More  and  more  it  is  becoming  clear  that  the  Community  must  speak 
with  one  voice :nd act  jointly if it  is to  have  the greatest  impact  in  its 
relations  with  the  energy  producers - whether oil, gas,  coal  or  nuclear 
fuels.  And,  increasingly,  we  are  doing  so. 
1 ••• 8
IV  - ISSUES  FOR  INTERNATIONAL  COOPERATION 
·• 
The  emphasis  of  Community  policy  is  not  always  identical  to  that of  its 
partners  in  the  industrialised world.  Perceptions  on  opposite  sides of 
the Atlantic  do  differ.  And  there  are  some  understandable  reasons  why 
this  should  be  so.  Our  degrees  of  external  dependence  differ;  we  have  had 
differing  approaches  to  the  role  of public  authorities  (although  of  course 
they  vary  also  between  our  Member  States);  we  have  had  differing  attitudes 
to  the  regulation of  the  energy  markets.  And  differences of  emphasis  on 
other  questions  of  international  policy  (East-West  relations,  the Middle 
East)  may  spill over  a  little into  the  energy  field.  But  it is  easy  to 
exaggerate  the  differences  and  to  forget  the  wid~r communality  of  interests 
to  which  I  have  already  referred  and  which  have  been  reflected  in  the outcomes 
of  the  major  Western  Economic  Summits. 
The  picture  has  certainly been  complicated  a  little in  the  last  year  or  so  by 
the  divergence  of  views  between  Europe  and  the  United  States  about  the  merits 
and  the  risks  in  the  new  contracts  for  Soviet  gas  which  some  Community  members 
have  entered  into.  These  are  an  important  element  in  our  strategy of 
diversification.  That  they  carry  some  risks  is  well  understood.  Equally, 
however,  those  risks  have  to  be  set  against  ihe  alternative~ and  they 
can  and  will  be  minimised. 
At  the  end  of  the  day,  the  success  of  Europe's  policy of diversification 
is  a  fundamental  common  interest  with  the  United  States.  Just  as  we  in 
Europe  shall  be  critically affected  by  the  success  of  the  United  States 
in  constraining  its own  oil  consumption  and  sustaining  its oil production; 
by  the  speed  at  which  deregulation of  natural  gas  price occurs  and  by 
the  effect  that  has  on  both  consumption  and  supply;  by  the  pace  of  US 
nuclear  construction  and  commissioning;  and  by  the  health  of  the  US 
. ;  . .  coal  industry • 
j 
l 
I 9 It  is  right  that  we  should  consult  between  us  on  these  issues,  as  we  do; 
that  we  should  cement  our  understanding  of  each  other's policies•and that 
) 
we  should  explore  the  scope  for  bilateral  cooperation  as  well  as  multi-
lateral  cooperation  through  the  IEA  and  the  Western  Economic  Summits. 
This  we  are  doing  not  just  with  the  United  States,  but  with  each  of 
our  major  partners  in  the  Western  Alliance. 
The  main  areas  in  which  the  scope  for  such  cooperation  is greatest  are 
those  of  coal  and  nuclear  materials,  where  both  the  main  producers 
and  the  main  consumers  lie  in  the  industrialised world.  We  shall 
not  succeed  in  opening  up  the  markets  for  coal  in  Europe  if  we  cannot 
rely  on  growing  economic  and  secure  supplies  from  overseas- from  the  USA, 
from  Canada,  from  Australia.  The  coal  chain  is  a  long  and  complex  one 
and  to  make  sure  that  all  its  links  are  closed  will  require  the  closest 
of  cooperation  among  private  sector  operators  in  consuming  and  producing 
countries  within  a  framework  of  increasing  inter-Governmental  contact. 
There  is  also  scope  for  greater  cooperation  among  the  industrialised 
countries  in  the  development  of  new  energy  technologies - fusion,  coal 
gasification or  liquefaction,  new  forms  of  transport  and  energy 
storage  and  so  on. 10
IU. 
But  cooperation  among  Western  nations  is  not  enough  if  we  are 
fully  to  meet  the  energy  challenge  of  the  '80s  and  '90s,  and  to 
clear  the  glass  through  which  we  see  the future  so  darkly at  present. 
We  have  to  explore  two  other  avenues  if  we  are  to be  assured of  that 
energy  security  which  is  at  the  heart  of  our  energy policies. 
The  first  is  for  a  greater  meeting  of  minds  with  the oil producers 
themselves. 
There  are  some  who  may  be  tempted  by  the present  situation on 
the  oil  markets  to  rub  their  hands  with  satisfaction  about  the 
difficulties facing  OPEC  and  to  suggest  that  we  have  no  longer 
any  interest  in  seeking  better relations  with  the  producing  countries. 
This  is  profoundly  misguided.  To  sit  on  our  hands  rJhiLe  the  wind 
-'~  seems  to  be  blowing  our  way  is to  fall  into  the  same  trap  as  the 
oil producers  themselves  when  oil  prices  were  hard  and  they 
believed that  they  could  call  the  shots.  The  wind  can  change 
direction all  too  suddenly. 11
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Recent  events  have  surely underlined  the  mutual  interest of both 
oil producers  and  oil  consumers  in  the  developed  and  the developing  worlds 
in greater  stability and  predictability of oil  price  movements  and  supply 
levels.  We  in  the  industrialised world  need  this  to  help  plan  a  steady 
progress  out  of oil  while  avoiding  severe  shocks  to  our  balances-of-
payments.  It  would  give  the oil-importing  developing  countries  a  sounder 
basis  on  which  to  plan their own  economies  in  the  most  rational 
long-term  manner.  And  it  would  help  the producers  to  plan  more 
satisfactory depletion policies  and  the  long-term  financing  of their 
development  needs. · 
We  should  seize the present  opportunity  to  encourage  a  recognition 
of this  mutuality  of  interests.  There  are  certainly  reasons  to  doubt 
whether  the  time  is  ripe  for  successful  formal  multilateral  discussions on 
energy of the  kind  we  witnessed  in  the  mid  1970s  (the Paris  Conference). 
But  there  is  a  very  strong  case  for  exploring  more  informal  and  Less 
structured  ways  of  improving  the  meeting  of  minds. 
The  second  important  area of  international  cooperation  is  in 
our  relations  with  the oil-importing  developing  countries. 
The  developing rountries  include  about  100  countries  accounting  for 
nearly  half of  the  world's  population,  25%  of  world  economic  output  and 
15%  of  world  commercial  energy  consumption.  They  differ  widely  in  levels 
of per  capita  income  and  in  levels of  industrialisation and  urbanisation. 
They  span  a  wide  range of  economic  bases  with  different  prospects  for  future 
development:  some  depend  predominantly on  subsistence agriculture  while others 
are  based on  commercial  and  export  agriculture;  some  are predominantly 
mineral  exporters;  others  are  based  on  light  industry;  a  number  (the newly 
industrialised countries)  are  in  a  category  apart. 12
It is therefore  unreasonable  to generalise  too  much  about  the 
nature of their  energy  problems.  But  they  do  share  certain characteristics: 
rapidly  expanding  populations  engaged  in  a  process of 
urbanisation  and  industrialisation; 
a  shift  from  non-commercial  to  commercial  fuels  in their 
energy  balances; 
-a very  high  degree of dependence  on  oil  as  the  key  commercial 
energy  source.  Oil  provides  nearly 651.  of  commercial  energy 
supplies  in developing  countries  as  a  whole,  while  coal  is  used 
to  a  considerable extent  only  in  India  and  Korea  which  have 
indigenous  supplies. 
In  many  regions  of  the  developing  world,  the  energy  problem  is 
compounded  by  the  growing  scarcity of  firewood,  the  increasingly  acute 
problem of deforestation,  and  the  scarcity of  fertilisers  because  farm 
wastes  are  used  as  fuel.  Potential  shortages  of  both  fuel  wood  and oil 
interact  upon  each  other. 
It  is  in  the  interests of  the  whole  of  the  wo~ld to  ensure  that  the 
potential  energy  constraint  on  growth  in  developing  countries  can  be 
removed.  Developing  countries  are  likely to  be  an  increasingly  important 
element  in  world  trade  in  the  years  to  come  and  our  own  economic  prosperity 
will  depend  heavily on  their growth  and  development. 
Our  first  duty  toward  these  countries  must  be  to  leave  more  room 
on  the oil  markets· for  them  by  continuing  to  const~ain our  own  consumption. 
They  will  find  it  less  easy  than  we  do  to  shift  to other  fuels  and  to 
increase  the  efficiency of  their  energy  use. 13
But  the  balance-of-payments difficulties of  many  developing  countries 
and  the  evident  need  to  ensure greater  self-sufficiency'in energy  and 
to  maximise  the  world  availability of  energy  at  economic cost  means  that 
we  must  go  beyond  that.  We  must  consolidate  ard increase our  efforts to 
stimulate  domestic  energy  production  in the  developing  countries  and  to 
encourage  greater  energy  efficiency without however  constraining  their prospects 
for  growth. 
The  Community  and  its Member  States  have  a  good  track  record  in  the 
field  of  energy  aid.  Together  they  are  the  largest  source  of total  aid  for 
energy  investment  in  the  developing  countries,  after  the  World  Bank,  committing 
in  1980  some  S 1000  million,  and  they  are  the  single  Largest  source of  aid  in 
the  form  of grants.  In  1980  the  European  Investment  Bank  alone  committed 
close  to  g  300  million  for  energy  investment  in  developing  countries,  helping 
to  finance  purchases  of  equipment,  construction of  energy  supply  facilities 
and  so  on;  while  the  European  Commission  itself has  been  heavily  involved  in 
critical  areas of  technical  aid,  especially  in  the  field of  energy  programming 
(helping  to develop  supply  and  demand  balances  and  thereby  to  identify 
rational  policy options). 
We  have  already done  a  good  deal.  But  we  can  do  a  great  deal  more. 
-
And  we  can  do  it better  as  a  Community  by  coordinating  more  closely amongst 
ourselves  the  help  that  we  give;  by  ensuring  closer  cooperation  with  the  financial 
institutions of  the oil-producing  states;  by  ~aising closely  with  the mulit-
lateral  institutions - notably  the  World  Bank  and  the  UNDP  (United  Nations 
Development  Programme);  and  by  greater bilateral  and  multilateral  cooperation 
with  our  industrial  partners. 
/Ensuring  the  availabili~ 14
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Ensuring  the  availability of  finance  from  the  public  sector  budgets 
in  the  West  and  from  international  institutions  is however  not  a1l  that  is  require 
Sufficient  resources  will  not  be  mobilised  without  an  increased private  sector 
effort.  The  developing  countries  have  their  own  responsibilities  in this 
respect  in ensuring  that  the  conditions  are  right  for  the encouragement 
of both  public  and  private  investment  from  outside.  And  at  the  end  of  the  day 
it is  they  who  must  control  their  own  destinies  through  sensible  energy planning 
and  management. 
There  is,  I  believe,  a  wide  measure  of  agreement  about  the gravity 
of the  developing  world's  problems  in  the  energy  sector  and  a  wide  measure 
of  agreement  on  the  need  for  a  greater  cooperative  effort.  This  consensus 
was  evident  enough  at  last  year'~ United  Nations  Conference  on  New  and 
Renewable  Energies  in Nairobi. 
That  Conference  was  important  both  in  itself  and  also  as  the only  international 
forum  for  the  moment  for  discussion  of  energy  issues.  It provided  an 
opportunity  to  range  beyond  the  specific  issues of  new  and  renewable  sources 
of  energy  into  the  wider  problems  of  world  energy  suppl~ and  demand.  It 
culminated  in  an  agreed  Action Programme.  Next  month  in  Rome  we  shall  be 
having  a  follow-up  meeting  on  the progress  made  with  the Programme.  We  in 
the  European  Commission  are  determined  to build  upon  what  has  been· 
agreed  so  far. 
CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
Let  me  say  two  things  in  conclusion. 
Firstly,  to  the  energy  forecaster  and  to  the  energy policy planner 
there  are  very  many  uncertainties  in  the  decade  ahead.  We  may  turn out to  be 
guilty of  excessive gloom  and  concern  about  the  pace  of  change  and  the  risks 15
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of  a  renewed  energy  constraint  on  growth.  Equally,  however,  there  are  many 
dark  scenarios  which  are  perfectly plausible.  Nobody  l{kes  to  think  too  hard 
about  what  an  economist  might  describe  as  exogenous  political  factors--
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Secondly,  while  those  of  us  involved  in  energy  cannot  presume  to 
prevent  the  emergence  of  such  exogenous  political factors,  we  can  try  to 
ensure  that their  macro-economic  effects  are  minimised  by  rigorous pursuit 
of the goals  that  each  of our  countries  has  set  itself for  more  diversified 
energy  supply  and  more  efficient energy  use. 
These  goals  will  not  be  successfully  achieved  without  extended 
cooperation  amongst  those of  us  in  the  developed  world. and  between  us ·and  the 
oil-importing  countries,  and  the oil  producers. 
It  would  help  us  all  if this  Symposium  could  contribute  to  identify 
appropriate  guidelines  for  our  common  action. 